St. John's Law Review
Volume 87, Spring-Summer 2013, Numbers 2-3

Article 8

H.R. 4624: The Pitfalls of a Self-Regulatory Organization for
Investment Advisers and Why User Fees Would Better Accomplish
the Goal of Investment Adviser Accountability
David G. Tittsworth

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu.

FINAL_TITTSWORTH

2/27/2014 6:25 PM

H.R. 4624: THE PITFALLS OF A
SELF-REGULATORY ORGANIZATION
FOR INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND WHY
USER FEES WOULD BETTER ACCOMPLISH
THE GOAL OF INVESTMENT ADVISER
ACCOUNTABILITY
DAVID G. TITTSWORTH†
INTRODUCTION
On April 25, 2012, Representative Spencer Bachus III (R-Al.)
introduced House Bill 4624, the Investment Adviser Oversight
Act of 2012 (“H.R. 4624”), which mandated membership in a selfregulatory organization (“SRO”) for many Securities and
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and state-registered investment
advisers. The bill, while ultimately not enacted, would have
subjected thousands of advisory firms to an additional layer of
regulation by a private regulator with broad rulemaking,
inspection, and enforcement authority—and, in all likelihood,
that private regulator would have been the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority (“FINRA”).
The Investment Adviser Association (“IAA”) strongly opposed
H.R. 4624. The substantial drawbacks to an SRO significantly
outweigh any potential benefits. These drawbacks include
minimal transparency and accountability, insufficient oversight
by the SEC and Congress, conflicts of interest, excessive costs,
and the lack of meaningful due process protections and costbenefit analysis restraints.
H.R. 4624 unfairly targeted small businesses. Because of
exemptions in the bill, smaller advisers were singled out for
additional regulation and costs. The substantial costs and
†
Executive Director and Executive Vice President, Investment Adviser
Association. This Article is adapted from the author’s statement from The
Investment Adviser Oversight Act of 2012: Hearing on H.R. 4624 Before the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. (2012).
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bureaucracy of an additional, unnecessary layer of SRO
regulation and oversight of advisory firms would have had a
significant adverse impact on small businesses and job creation.
Further, the bill would have resulted in inconsistent regulation
and regulatory arbitrage.
Supporters indicated that the bill responded to an SEC
report mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) studying various
options to enhance SEC examinations of investment advisers. If
enhancing investment adviser examinations was the objective,
however, H.R. 4624 represented both the least effective and the
most costly option. H.R. 4624 ventured far beyond the focus on
investment adviser examinations to extend an additional layer of
unnecessary regulation on advisers. Supporters also claimed
that the bill would have “level[ed] [the] playing field” for brokers
and advisers.1 They did not, however, commend the benefits of
FINRA regulation. Rather, this was an attempt to impose on
investment advisers the same regulatory framework that
currently exists for brokers. Far from leveling the playing field,
this bill would have created a dramatically tilted playing field by
burdening those investment advisers captured by this bill with
additional, unnecessary regulation.
The IAA particularly opposed, and still opposes, extending
FINRA’s jurisdiction to investment advisers due to its lack of
transparency and accountability, questionable track record,
experience and bias favoring the broker-dealer regulatory model,
and the costs involved. Alternatively, the IAA has expressed
support for appropriate measures to enhance the SEC’s
examination program for investment advisers. The SEC, a
governmental regulator that is accountable to Congress and the
public, has more than seven decades of experience and expertise
regulating and inspecting investment advisers. The SEC is best
positioned to provide effective oversight for all SEC-registered
investment advisers, irrespective of asset size and type of clients
served. To ensure that the SEC has sufficient resources for
adviser oversight, and as an alternative to an SRO, the IAA
supports the assessment of an appropriate “user fee” on SEC1
The Investment Adviser Oversight Act of 2012: Hearing on H.R. 4624 Before the
H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 42 (2012) (statement of Chet Helck, Chief
Executive Officer, Global Private Client Group, Raymond James Financial Inc. and
Chairman-Elect, Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association).
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registered investment advisers to be used solely to fund
additional examinations by the SEC. Legislation to authorize
user fees should include provisions that: (1) specifically preclude
any investment adviser SRO if such fees are imposed; (2) clarify
that such user fees will be dedicated to an increased level of
investment adviser examinations—instead of simply being used
as substitute funding for the existing level of examinations; and
(3) set forth specific SEC reporting requirements and review of
any such user fees by Congress and the public.
The user fee approach provides many benefits. User fees
would provide stable yet scalable resources to support and
strengthen the SEC’s examination of investment advisers. The
fees collected would be used solely to fund enhancements to the
investment adviser examination program and increase the
frequency of adviser examinations. Importantly, the reporting
and accountability embedded in the user fee approach would
provide substantial transparency and opportunity for
congressional oversight and public input.
As demonstrated by a Boston Consulting Group (“BCG”)
report, the costs of user fees would be significantly less than the
costs of SRO oversight.2 Further, if an investment adviser SRO
were mandated, the resulting new oversight responsibilities
would require the SEC to expend significant additional
resources. In summary, the IAA strongly believes that there are
better answers than the option presented by H.R. 4624. Now
that the bill has been defeated, the IAA strongly urges Congress
to consider other—and better—options.
I.

BACKGROUND

Investment advisers manage assets for a wide array of
individual and institutional investors.
As of April 2013,
approximately 10,500 investment advisers were registered with
the SEC, collectively managing assets totaling about $54.8
trillion for millions of individual and institutional clients.3
2
BOS. CONSULTING GRP., INVESTMENT ADVISOR OVERSIGHT: ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS (2011), available at http://advisors4advisors.com/files/BCG_
IAOversightStudy.pdf.
3
See INV. ADVISER ASS’N & NAT’L REGULATORY SERVS., 2012 EVOLUTION
REVOLUTION: A PROFILE OF THE INVESTMENT ADVISER PROFESSION 2 (2013),
available at https://www.investmentadviser.org/eweb/docs/Publications_News/Rep
orts_and_Brochures/IAA-NRS_Evolution_Revolution_Reports/evolution_revolution_
2013.pdf.
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Investment advisers engage in a wide range of advisory activities
and implement investment strategies on behalf of their clients,
including constructing securities portfolios pursuant to client
directives, recommending asset allocation, providing portfolio
analysis and evaluation, assisting in selecting and monitoring
other advisers, and providing wealth management and financial
planning services. In addition, investment advisers manage
assets for individuals, families, trusts, mutual funds, hedge
funds, private equity funds, pension plans, state and municipal
entities, banks, insurance companies, charitable endowments,
foundations, and corporations, and serve as sub-advisers to funds
or accounts managed by other advisers. These activities play a
critical role in helping investors, both individually and through
pooled investment vehicles, achieve their financial goals.
While investment advisory firms range from small, local or
regional firms to large global financial institutions with varying
business models, the overwhelming majority of investment
advisory firms are small businesses. Indeed, more than half of
all federally-registered advisers employ fewer than ten
employees and more than eighty-five percent employ fewer than
fifty non-clerical employees.4 In addition, most of the 17,300
state-registered investment advisers are small businesses.5 A
self-regulatory organization, such as that mandated by H.R.
4624, would have disproportionately affected these small
businesses, subjecting them to expansive rulemaking, inspection,
and enforcement authority by a private regulator.
H.R. 4624 would have mandated SRO membership for SECregistered and state-registered investment advisers, subject to
broad exemptions.6 Specifically, the legislation would have
exempted an advisory firm if it had a single mutual fund as a
client—no matter the fund’s size and regardless of other firm
characteristics.7 The legislation would have also exempted an
advisory firm if ninety percent or more of the firm’s assets under
management (“AUM”) were attributable to “qualified
purchasers”—that is, individuals with $5 million in investments

4
5

Id.
See

N. AM. SEC. ADM’RS ASS’N, THE IA SWITCH: A SUCCESSFUL
COLLABORATION TO ENHANCE INVESTOR PROTECTION 2 (2013), available at
http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/IA-Switch-Report.pdf.
6
H.R. 4624, 112th Cong. § 2 (2012).
7
Id.
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or institutions with $25 million in investments—hedge funds,
private equity funds, venture capital funds, non-U.S. clients,
other investment advisers and broker-dealers, and other entities,
including certain non-profit clients, real estate funds, issuers of
asset-backed securities, and tax-qualified retirement funds.8 In
addition, investment advisers that were affiliated with these
exempt advisory firms would have been largely excluded from the
SRO membership requirement.9 The SEC, however, would have
been tasked with determining on a case-by-case basis whether an
affiliate is sufficiently independent from the exempt adviser such
that SRO membership should be required.10
The bill would have required that SRO rules be designed to
prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts, to promote “business
conduct standards” for its members consistent with advisers’
obligations to investors, to be consistent with the fiduciary
standards applicable to advisers under the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”) or state law, and to not unnecessarily
duplicate, overlap, or conflict with such laws.11 The SRO would
have had authority to enforce the Advisers Act and any SRO
rules and to establish disciplinary procedures to do so.12 The bill
would have required SRO rules to establish appropriate
procedures to “register persons associated with members” and to
require “supervisory systems” for members and their associated
persons.13
Under the bill, the SRO would have been required to provide
for “periodic” examinations of its members and their associated
persons to determine compliance with the Advisers Act and SRO
rules.14 However, the SRO would not have conducted periodic
exams of a state-regulated adviser in a state that had adopted a
plan to conduct an on-site examination of all state-regulated
advisers, on average, once every four years.15 In addition, the
SRO would have been permitted to conduct “for cause” exams of
all members of the SRO, including state-registered advisers.16
8

Id.
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
9
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The bill would have required the SEC to conduct annual
inspections of the SRO to ensure it complied with the Advisers
Act and its rules and regulations.17 Further, the bill would have
required the SRO to issue a publicly available annual report to
the SEC on its operations, performance, and financial condition.18
Although the legislation would have allowed for more than one
“national investment adviser association” to apply to become an
adviser SRO, the bill was structured to most readily enable
FINRA to act in that capacity.19
II. WHY THE IAA STRONGLY OPPOSED H.R. 4624 AND AN SRO
FOR INVESTMENT ADVISERS GENERALLY
The IAA strongly opposes mandating an SRO for investment
advisers. The SEC’s regulation and oversight of investment
advisers should not be outsourced to a private regulator
unaccountable to Congress or the public. The IAA believes that
the SEC is the most efficient and effective regulator of SECregistered investment advisers. There is simply no compelling
reason to outsource oversight of investment advisers to either a
new SRO or any existing entity that has no expertise with the
investment adviser industry or its regulatory framework.
The SRO regime that would have been established by H.R.
4624 is flawed. It would have resulted in inconsistent regulation
of the same or similar activities and encouraged regulatory
arbitrage. In addition, the SRO model set forth in H.R. 4624 was
not cost effective. It would have specifically targeted small
businesses for unnecessary costs and burdens, exacerbated the
SEC’s challenges in allocating its resources, and resulted in
unnecessary expansion of burdensome regulations and
bureaucracy. The legislation was clearly designed to favor
FINRA’s organizational model. We particularly oppose extending
FINRA’s jurisdiction to investment advisers, due to FINRA’s lack
of investment adviser expertise, lack of accountability, lack of
transparency, excessive costs, and questionable track record.

17
18
19

Id.
Id.
Id.
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The SRO Model Is Flawed.

The SRO model of regulation suffers from significant flaws.
SROs are not accountable to Congress or the public and are not
subject to requirements related to the Administrative Procedure
Act (“APA”), the public records laws, due process, the Freedom of
Information Act, cost-benefit analysis, and other critical
protections. Moreover, the effectiveness of SROs has not been
demonstrated. These deficiencies in the SRO model have been
identified in meaningful reports and studies, including those
from the SEC staff, the Government Accountability Office
(“GAO”), the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and the Boston
Consulting Group.
Congress, in Dodd-Frank Act section 914, directed the SEC
to conduct a study to review and analyze the need for enhanced
examination and enforcement resources of investment advisers.
The SEC issued a staff report (“Section 914 Report”) expressing
concern that it did not have sufficient capacity to conduct
effective examinations of investment advisers with adequate
frequency and set forth three options for addressing this concern:
(1) assess user fees on SEC-registered investment advisers to
fund their examinations by the SEC; (2) authorize one or more
SROs to examine all SEC-registered investment advisers; and
(3) authorize FINRA to examine dual registrants for compliance
with the Advisers Act.20 The Section 914 Report identified
significant drawbacks to the SRO model, notably including
conflicts of interest inherent in self-regulation and the costs and
funding involved.
A 2011 GAO report studying a potential SRO for private
fund advisers similarly found serious drawbacks to the SRO
model, including its potential to
(1) increase the overall cost of regulation by adding another
layer of oversight; (2) create conflicts of interest, in part because
of the possibility for self-regulation to favor the interests of the
industry over the interests of investors and the public; and

20

SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, STUDY ON ENHANCING INVESTMENT ADVISER
EXAMINATIONS 4 (2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/914study
final.pdf [hereinafter SECTION 914 REPORT].
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(3) limit transparency and accountability, as the SRO would be
accountable primarily to its members rather than to Congress
or the public.21

In addition, the report noted that the SRO model “expose[s]
firms to duplicative examinations and costs.”22
Consistent with these studies, the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce focused, in a 2011 report, on the lack of accountability
by certain nongovernmental policymakers with significant and
growing influence, including FINRA:
Despite their tremendous influence over the workings of the
capital markets, these organizations are generally subject to few
or none of the traditional checks and balances that constrain
government agencies. This means they are devoid of or
substantially lack critical elements of governance and
operational transparency, substantive and procedural standards
for decision making, and meaningful due process mechanisms
that allow market participants to object to their
determinations.23

The Chamber of Commerce report further observed that
SROs are not bound by the congressional appropriations process
or other comparable checks on their power.24
Moreover, in a study required by section 967 of the DoddFrank Act of the SEC’s structure, organization, and need for
reforms (“BCG Section 967 Report”), BCG found numerous
problems in the SEC’s relationship with SROs, including
inadequate oversight and lack of standards to measure SRO
effectiveness. BCG found that

21
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRIVATE FUND ADVISERS: ALTHOUGH A
SELF-REGULATORY ORGANIZATION COULD SUPPLEMENT SEC OVERSIGHT, IT WOULD
PRESENT CHALLENGES AND TRADE-OFFS 20 (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d11623.pdf. Section 416 of the Dodd-Frank Act required the GAO to study
the feasibility of forming an SRO to provide primary oversight of private fund
advisers.
22
Id.
23
U.S. CHAMBER’S CTR. FOR CAPITAL MKTS. COMPETITIVENESS, U.S. CAPITAL
MARKETS COMPETITIVENESS: THE UNFINISHED AGENDA 5 (2011) [hereinafter
CAPITAL MARKETS REPORT], available at https://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/
files/legacy/reports/1107_UnfinishedAgenda_WEB.pdf.
24
Id. at 14; see also BOS. CONSULTING GRP., INC., U.S. SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION: ORGANIZATIONAL STUDY AND REFORM 25 (2011)
[hereinafter BCG SECTION 967 REPORT], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
studies/2011/967study.pdf.
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[g]iven the role of SROs in the regulatory framework, it is vital
that the SEC develop both a clear set of standards for how SROs
are to regulate and a means for assessing whether SROs are
complying with those standards. . . . To strengthen its oversight
of SROs, however, there are additional actions that can be
taken . . . .25

These actions include “[e]nhanc[ing] SRO disclosures regarding
their regulatory operations”; “institut[ing] metrics to monitor
SROs and minimum standards for their regulatory activities”;
and “enhanc[ing] FINRA oversight.”26
The BCG Section 967 Report observed that SROs are not
accountable to the SEC and that the agency and SROs are not
coordinating effectively.27 The report noted that if the SEC were
to be funded adequately, rather than expanding the role of SROs,
“there are strong arguments and global precedents to consolidate
more regulatory activities from SROs into the national regulator.
This will reduce real and/or perceived conflicts of interest that
SROs may have, ensure greater control and visibility into market
information for the SEC, and clarify the governance of securities
regulation.”28
Further, the BCG Section 967 Report found that the SEC
has not been able to fully leverage and oversee SROs due to
certain legal issues. For example, FINRA has been reluctant to
share examination and other information with the SEC,
asserting that under the “state actor” doctrine, such sharing
could cause FINRA to be deemed a government actor for various
purposes, including the constitutional rights of defendants in
enforcement actions.29
H.R. 4624 did not adequately address any of these
deficiencies in the SRO model. For example, although it would
have required the SRO to explain and respond to comments
received regarding the costs and benefits of a proposed rule, the
25
BCG SECTION 967 REPORT, supra note 24, at 134. The SEC selected BCG, a
well-established consulting firm, to conduct the mandated study.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 25.
28
Id. at 150.
29
Id. at 65. Section (g)(2) of H.R. 4624 provides that the sharing of information
by an adviser SRO with state or federal agencies will not be “construed to be the
action of such an agency.” H.R. 4624, 112th Cong. § 2(g)(2) (2012). It is not clear
whether this provision adequately addresses the constitutional analysis of state
action. Further, while it permits the sharing of information, it does not compel an
SRO to actually do so. Id. § 2.
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bill did not require the SRO to affirmatively conduct its own costbenefit analysis. Further, it would have provided no direct
remedies for an SRO’s failure to adequately do so; interested
parties would not have been able to bring suit against the SRO to
ensure it conducted an appropriate cost-benefit analysis.
Presumably, the SEC would have been required to determine
that the SRO met its obligations to conduct a cost-benefit
analysis with respect to each of its proposals, but, historically,
the SEC has not scrutinized SRO proposals in this way. Such
analysis by the SEC would have required substantial additional
effort and resources.
Similarly, the bill did not address the transparency typically
lacking in the SRO model. An SRO designated pursuant to this
legislation would not have been required to hold open meetings,
to respond to Freedom of Information Act requests, or otherwise
comply with the APA. Although the bill required an SRO to
submit an annual report, it did not require congressional or SEC
oversight of the SRO’s budget or governance.30 Nor did it address
concerns regarding due process protections during disciplinary
hearings.31 The bill referenced notice-and-comment rulemaking
under the APA but did not clearly apply the APA to an SRO’s
consideration of its rules and rule changes, nor did it provide
direct recourse if APA procedures were not followed. In addition,
the SEC’s oversight of SRO rulemaking may have been largely
deferential: The SEC would only need to find that the “proposed
rule is consistent with the Exchange Act”; thus, the SEC was not
required to pass judgment on the wisdom or merits of the SRO
rules.32
30
See SECTION 914 REPORT, supra note 20, at 37 n.82 (comparing the PCAOB
and FINRA governance models and noting that the PCAOB model requires SEC
review of the annual budget and SEC appointment of board members); see also U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-625, SECURITIES REGULATION:
OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO IMPROVE SEC’S OVERSIGHT OF THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY
REGULATORY AUTHORITY 16 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 GAO REPORT], available at
http://gao.gov/assets/600/591222.pdf (noting that the SEC historically has not
overseen FINRA’s budget, executive compensation, or governance issues).
31
Fixing the Watchdog: Legislative Proposals To Improve and Enhance the
Securities and Exchange Commission: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.,
112 Cong. 77 (2011) (statement of Paul S. Atkins, Visiting Scholar, Am. Enter. Inst.)
[hereinafter Atkins Testimony] (raising due process concerns regarding FINRA
disciplinary hearings and noting that FINRA’s claim that it is not a “state actor”
may deny defendants the right to invoke the Fifth Amendment).
32
See BCG SECTION 967 REPORT, supra note 24, at 65 (noting limited nature of
SEC’s review of SRO rules).
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H.R. 4624 Would Have Resulted in Inconsistent Regulation
and Regulatory Arbitrage

The SRO regime mandated by H.R. 4624 would have been
particularly inappropriate for investment advisers. Indeed, the
Section 914 Report catalogues numerous problems inherent in
designating an SRO for the diverse investment advisory
profession, including questions regarding governance, scope of
authority, membership, conflicts of interest, and funding. For
example, the report observes that an adviser SRO presents
unique governance issues given the diversity of the industry,
because it will be challenging to ensure that no business model
dominates or is given a competitive advantage by the SRO.33 The
report also notes the concern that an SRO might have access to
unique data and could seek to sell related services to the
members it regulates.
The Section 914 Report particularly notes the challenges
presented in considering the scope of a potential SRO, stating
that “[c]rafting exclusions for certain types of investment
advisers could be difficult in practice because . . . many
investment advisers have diverse client bases and business lines.
Moreover, exclusions could provide opportunities for regulatory
arbitrage.”34 These challenges were amply demonstrated by
H.R. 4624.
H.R. 4624 evidently attempted to distinguish between
“retail” investment advisory firms and “institutional” advisory
firms; the former would have been subject to SRO requirements,
while the latter would have remained solely under SEC
regulation and oversight.35
The bill, however, did not
Instead, the legislation’s
appropriately draw these lines.36
exemptions from SRO requirements would have resulted in
inconsistent treatment of investment advisers engaged in similar
33

SECTION 914 REPORT, supra note 20, at 35.
Id.
35
See H.R. 4624, 112th Cong. § 2 (2012).
36
There is no settled notion of a “retail” investment advisory firm. For example,
an advisory firm may specialize in advising highly wealthy individuals—for
example, with $2 million to $4 million in investable assets—and small or mid-sized
businesses, pension plans, or endowments—for example, with $10 million to $20
million in assets. Even though most would not consider such a firm to be “retail”
oriented, it would not qualify for the SRO exemption under H.R. 4624 because its
clients do not meet the “qualified purchaser” threshold—$5 million in investable
assets for individuals and $25 million for entities. Id.
34
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activities—including different registration and licensing
requirements,
different
substantive
regulations,
and
substantially different costs. In addition to the SRO membership
requirements, similar or identical advisers would have likely
been subject to different disclosure, advertising, or supervision
rules. One set of advisers would have been subject only to SEC
or state rules. Another similar or identical set of advisers would
have been subject to both SEC or state rules and a new set of
technical, detailed “business conduct” rules. These disparities
were not justified by reasoned analysis.
For example, the bill exempted from SRO membership any
investment adviser if one or more of its clients was a mutual
fund.37 This means that two nearly identical firms—same types
of clients, assets under management, number of employees,
investment style, revenues, profitability, and so forth—would
have been treated differently if one firm had a single mutual
fund client and the other did not. An adviser that manages
assets for high-net-worth individuals38 and one mutual fund
would have been subject to a different set of rules than an
adviser that manages assets only for high-net-worth clients.
The ninety percent test in H.R. 4624 produced similarly
anomalous results.39 An advisory firm that manages $150 billion
in assets would have been exempt from the SRO requirements of
H.R. 4624, even though a very large amount of assets—up to $15
billion—could have been attributable to thousands of “retail”
clients. At the same time, an advisory firm that manages $150
million in assets would have been subject to SRO requirements if
only $16 million of its assets were attributable to relatively few
“retail” clients. Similarly, an adviser that manages assets,
eleven percent of which were attributable to “retail” clients,
would have been subject to different rules than an identical
adviser that manages assets, nine percent of which were
attributable to such clients. Further, an adviser with one client
base and investment strategy could have been subject to a
37

Id.
Most SEC-registered advisers—more than sixty percent—manage assets for
high-net-worth individuals, according to data filed on Form ADV, Part 1, which
defines “high net worth” individuals generally as those with $2 million or more in
net worth excluding primary residence. Note that H.R. 4624 only includes ultrahigh-net-worth individuals—$5 million or more in investments—in its list of
exempted clients. See id.
39
Id.
38
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different set of rules than an adviser with an identical client base
and investment strategy simply because it was affiliated with an
exempt adviser.
The legislation likely would have encouraged regulatory
arbitrage as firms restructured their businesses and/or dismissed
individual and small business clients to avoid the costs and
additional regulatory burdens of an SRO. The bill would have
driven business models and created structural incentives. For
example, many investment advisers that would have otherwise
been subject to SRO regulation may have decided to establish or
sub-advise a small mutual fund. Similarly, advisers may have
chosen to affiliate with other investment advisers that either
advise a mutual fund or manage sufficient “institutional” assets
to absorb the adviser within its aggregated ninety percent AUM
threshold for exemption from SRO membership. Advisers may
have also avoided having the AUM of smaller clients attributed
to them by structuring arrangements to sub-advise or provide
model portfolio management to other advisers with those clients.
These structural changes would have led to even more
advisers remaining under SEC oversight than the bill
contemplated and that have the same core business and clients
as the advisers subject to SRO jurisdiction, further exacerbating
the inconsistent regulation of similar businesses. The Section
914 Report identified similar concerns, noting that if an SRO is
limited in its membership by clientele type or other
characteristics, many advisers would still be left under the SEC’s
oversight.40 The report observed that if the SEC and an SRO—or
multiple SROs—shared regulatory authority over advisers, the
regime would be vulnerable to regulatory arbitrage.41
C.

H.R. 4624 Was Not Cost Effective

Establishing and maintaining a new SRO would impose
substantial costs and burdens on investment advisers, with a
disproportionate impact on smaller advisers.
It would
exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, the SEC’s resource
constraints. Further, it would create an unnecessary additional
layer of regulation on advisers. At a time when small businesses,
including advisers, are becoming overwhelmed with new
40
41

BCG SECTION 967 REPORT, supra note 24, at 34–35.
Id. at 33.
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regulatory burdens, Congress should search for the least costly
and most effective alternative to directly address the specific
problem identified.
1.

The Bill Inappropriately Targeted Small Businesses with
Additional Costs and Regulations

H.R. 4624 would have disproportionately burdened
thousands of small businesses that serve small and mid-sized
investors with the costs of a duplicative and unnecessary layer of
regulation and bureaucracy.
The bill’s exemptions for advisers to mutual funds, private
funds, “qualified purchasers,” and certain other clients meant
that the vast majority of larger advisory firms would not be
subject to SRO membership requirements. Instead, thousands of
smaller advisory firms would be required to shoulder the costs of
establishing and maintaining an SRO. As one commentator
recently noted, H.R. 4624 “would impose a tax on small advisory
businesses and, indirectly, the mainstream investors they advise,
from which large advisors and their high net worth clients would
be exempt.”42 Further, there is no evidence that imposing an
SRO on these small firms, which represent a small fraction of the
assets managed by advisers, would address the SEC’s resource
constraints or uncover problems of substantial magnitude.43
As discussed below, the costs on small business to establish
and maintain an SRO would be substantial. In addition, the
impact of an additional layer of regulation and bureaucracy on
these small firms would result in a significant and unnecessary
burden. Compliance with SEC regulations, as well as other
applicable regulations—including Department of Labor
regulations—currently requires significant dedication of
resources by investment advisory firms. If the substantial costs
of this additional layer of regulation on these small businesses
were passed on to investors, it would negatively affect retirement

42
Mercer Bullard, The New Self-Regulator for Advisors: A Taxing Affair for
Small Businesses and Small Investors, MORNINGSTAR (May 10, 2012),
http://ibd.morningstar.com/article/article.asp?id=553408&CN=brf295,http://ibd.morn
ingstar.com/archive/archive.asp?inputs=days=14;frmtId=12,%20brf295.
43
Indeed, the stated poster-child for this legislation, Bernard Madoff’s
brokerage firm, which had been subject to SEC and FINRA inspections for decades
before it registered as an investment adviser in September 2006, would likely have
been exempt from the SRO membership requirements in H.R. 4624. See id.
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savings and investment.44 If pricing resistance is such that all of
the costs cannot be passed on, the costs would have a significant
impact on job retention and creation in these small businesses—
in which human resources account for the vast portion of the cost
structure.
2.

The Bill Would Have Exacerbated, Not Ameliorated, the
SEC’s Resource Issues

H.R. 4624 would not have eased the SEC’s resource
constraints but would have instead placed additional burdens on
the agency. Appropriate government oversight is required in any
SRO structure and thus requires dedication of significant
government resources. The Section 914 Report observed that an
SRO would not free all of the resources the SEC currently
devotes to investment adviser examinations:
Commission resources would still be required to oversee the
operations of any SRO by . . . conducting oversight examinations
of the SRO, considering appeals from sanctions imposed by the
SRO, and approving SRO fee and rule changes. Substantial
resources of both [the inspection staff and the policy staff] are
currently employed to oversee the activities of FINRA.45

For example, the SEC employs more than 300 staff to examine,
and oversee FINRA’s examination program of, broker-dealers—in
addition to close to fifty inspection staff who currently focus on
FINRA and other SRO oversight.46 Additional, substantial SEC
expenditures will be required in the future just to effectively
oversee the current SROs under its jurisdiction.47
These current challenges would be magnified not only by the
extension of SRO jurisdiction to SEC-registered advisers but also
to thousands of state-registered advisers. The SEC would be
obligated to exercise appropriate supervision over the SRO’s
activities regarding thousands of state-registered advisers with
respect to which the SEC currently has no regulatory
44

See, e.g., BCG SECTION 967 REPORT, supra note 24, at 151 (noting potential
for SRO costs to be passed on “to investors in a way that makes investing
unaffordable for many”).
45
SECTION 914 REPORT, supra note 20, at 30; see also Bullard, supra note 42.
46
BCG SECTION 967 REPORT, supra note 24, at 64; SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
STUDY ON INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS A-15 (2011) [hereinafter
SECTION 913 REPORT], available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913study
final.pdf.
47
BCG SECTION 967 REPORT, supra note 24, at 39–41.
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responsibility.
As a result, H.R. 4624 likely would have
exacerbated the SEC’s resource constraints.
Indeed, the
legislation may have resulted in a double layer of expenditures—
investment advisers would have been required to pay substantial
fees to an SRO for regulation and the SEC would have had to reallocate substantial funds to fulfill extensive additional oversight
responsibilities for the SRO.
In addition, this bill would have required the SEC to conduct
a firm-by-firm analysis of which companies under common
control should have been subject to SRO jurisdiction and which
should have remained solely under SEC jurisdiction due to their
affiliations with other entities solely under SEC jurisdiction.
There are almost 4,000 SEC-registered advisers with affiliated
investment advisers.48 The analysis of these firms would have
consumed substantial SEC resources, not only initially, but on an
ongoing basis as firms affiliated or changed their affiliations over
time.
Former SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro has testified
regarding the strain that review of SRO rulemaking places on
the agency. She stated that the
Dodd-Frank Act’s imposition of new procedural requirements
with respect to the SEC’s processing of proposed SRO rule
changes has placed further demands on an already complex and
resource-intensive process. The volume of annual requests has
increased by over 80 percent in the last five years, with the
Commission receiving over 2,000 requests for approval or
guidance in 2011.49

The addition of oversight duties for an adviser SRO with
rulemaking authority would only compound these concerns and
further strain SEC resources.

48
See Norm Champ, Deputy Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections &
Examinations, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., Speech at the New York City Bar: What SEC
Registration Means for Hedge Fund Advisors (May 11, 2012), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch051112nc.htm.
49
Oversight of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 112th Cong. 63 (2012) (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Securities
and Exchange Commission) [hereinafter SEC 2012 Testimony].
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An SRO Would Result in Unnecessary and Costly Regulation

The current regulatory framework for investment advisers is
robust and protects investors. There is no evidence that a second
layer of regulation imposed by an SRO is needed. Investment
advisers are comprehensively regulated through the rules and
requirements promulgated by the SEC and are subject to
inspections and oversight by the agency. Investment advisers
are subject to an overarching fiduciary duty requiring them to act
in their clients’ best interest and disclose all material facts and
conflicts of interest.
Pursuant to the Advisers Act, as a fiduciary, “an investment
adviser must at all times act in its clients’ best interests, and its
conduct will be measured against a higher standard of conduct
than that used for mere commercial transactions.”50 In practical
terms, fiduciary duty means that, in the course of providing
advice to clients, advisers must disclose all material information
and conflicts of interest to their clients, including the fees that
they charge, how they plan to recommend securities to clients,
and any material disciplinary information involving the firms or
their investment personnel. Moreover, as fiduciaries, advisers
must treat their clients fairly and not favor one client over
another, especially if they would somehow benefit from favoring
one particular client or type of client. Most important, whenever
the interests of investment advisers differ from those of their
clients, advisers must explain the conflict to the clients and act to
mitigate or eliminate it, ensuring they act in the interests of the
client and not for their own benefit.
This well-established standard has been consistently
interpreted and applied by the SEC and the courts to require
investment advisers to serve their clients with the highest duty
of loyalty and duty of care.51 Among the specific obligations that
flow from an adviser’s fiduciary duty are the following: (1) the
duty to have an adequate, reasonable basis for its investment
advice; (2) the duty to seek best execution for clients’ securities
transactions where the adviser directs such transactions; (3) the
duty to render advice that is suitable to clients’ needs, objectives,
and financial circumstances; (4) the duty not to subrogate clients’
50
Thomas P. Lemke & Gerald T. Lins, Regulation of Investment Advisers § 2:33
(2013); see also SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191
(1963).
51
Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 194.
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interests to its own; (5) the duty not to use client assets for itself;
(6) the duty to maintain client confidentiality; and (7) the duty to
make full and fair disclosure to clients of all material facts,
particularly regarding conflicts of interest.52
In addition, all SEC-registered investment advisers are
required to submit detailed registration information on Form
ADV, Part 1, which is publicly available, and update it at least
annually and promptly for material changes.53 Advisers are also
required to provide clients with a plain English brochure and
brochure supplement, Form ADV, Part 2.54 The brochures are
filed with the SEC and are publicly available. The brochure and
brochure supplement provide extensive information regarding
each investment adviser and key advisory personnel. Advisers
are required to disclose detailed information about their firms,
including: the educational and business background of each
person who determines or provides advice to clients; the adviser’s
basic fee schedule, including how fees are charged and whether
such fees are negotiable; types of investments and methods of
securities analysis used; how the adviser reviews client accounts;
the adviser’s other business activities; material financial
arrangements with a wide variety of entities; certain referral
arrangements; and numerous other disclosures that describe
activities that may pose potential conflicts of interest with the
adviser’s clients, including specific disclosures relating to trading
and brokerage practices. In addition, advisers to private funds
must soon submit extensive information to the SEC about their
holdings, counterparty exposures, performance, and leverage on
the new Form PF.

52
See Amendments to Form ADV, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3060,
2010 WL 2957506, at *1 (Aug. 12, 2010) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275, 279);
Suitability of Investment Advice Provided by Investment Advisers; Custodial
Account Statements for Certain Advisory Clients, Investment Advisers Act Release
No. 1406, 59 FR 13,464 n.3 (proposed Mar. 16, 1994) (noting duty of full disclosure of
conflicts of interest, duty of loyalty, duty of best execution, and duty of care);
Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners, Pension
Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory Services as a
Component of Other Financial Services, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1092,
1987 WL 112702, at *7–8 (Oct. 8, 1987) (discussing fiduciary duties); see also Capital
Gains, 375 U.S. at 191, 194.
53
See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM ADV: GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 1, available
at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formadv-instructions.pdf.
54
See id. at 3.
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Investment advisers also are subject to a variety of
requirements relating to proxy voting, books and records, insider
trading, custody, privacy, best execution, advertising, and
referral arrangements. Importantly, the assets managed by
investment advisers must be held at registered broker-dealers or
banks.55 Investment advisers must adopt written codes of ethics,
which must set forth standards of conduct expected of advisory
personnel and address conflicts that arise from personal trading
by advisory personnel. Advisers also must adopt and implement
written policies and procedures reasonably designed to prevent
violations of the Advisers Act, review the policies and procedures
at least annually to determine the adequacy and effectiveness of
their implementation, and designate a chief compliance officer
responsible for administering the policies and procedures. Under
these rules, advisers have the flexibility to tailor their policies
and procedures to the nature of their business and clientele.
This regulatory framework is appropriate to the nature,
scope, and risks of the investment advisory business. No
additional layer of regulation is warranted. Further, SRO-style
business conduct rules are typically very detailed command-andcontrol requirements that seek to impose a one-size-fits-all
solution for various legal and regulatory issues. In contrast to
the principles-based SEC framework, these SRO “check-the-box”
regulations do not lend themselves to the widely divergent
community of advisers.
In addition, the SEC staff’s Section 914 Report raised
concerns that subjecting advisers to an SRO could lead to
inconsistent interpretations and applications of the Advisers Act.
The report noted that the possibility of multiple SROs—which,
though unlikely, H.R. 4624 would have permitted—could result
in SROs over time developing “different approaches to applying
the Advisers Act and their own rules to similar activities,”
prevention of which would require “vigorous oversight” by the
55

In response to the Madoff case, the SEC strengthened the “custody” rule to
enhance protection of client assets. See Oversight of the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission: Evaluating Present Reforms and Future Challenges: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., & Gov’t Sponsored Enters., 111th Cong.
59 (2010) (statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, Securities and Exchange
Commission) (“The rule leverages our own resources by relying on independent,
third-party accountants to confirm client assets and review custody controls in
situations where the possibility for misappropriation of client assets is most acute
because of the adviser’s possession of, or control over, client assets.”).
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SEC.56 The report also highlighted the difficulties involved in
requiring the SEC to oversee an SRO that has enforcement
authority with respect to a broad range of state regulatory
requirements, which would be the case if H.R. 4624 was enacted.
D. The IAA Opposes Designation of FINRA as an SRO for
Advisers
The H.R. 4624 legislation appears to have been designed to
favor FINRA as the presumptively designated SRO for advisers.
The bill was modeled on, and largely replicated, the Maloney Act,
which established the SRO structure pursuant to which FINRA
now operates.
FINRA—a self-described “non-governmental
regulator” with 3,000 employees and more than $1.1 billion in
total revenues—was designed and developed to oversee brokerdealer activity.57 FINRA has clearly indicated its desire to
extend its jurisdiction to include oversight and regulation of
investment advisers.58 The IAA strongly opposes extending
FINRA’s jurisdiction to investment advisers due to its lack of
adviser expertise, lack of accountability, lack of transparency,
excessive costs,59 and questionable track record.60
56

SECTION 914 REPORT, supra note 20, at 33.
See FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., FINRA 2010 YEAR IN REVIEW AND
ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT 48, 78 (2011) [hereinafter FINRA 2010 YEAR IN
REVIEW], available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/corporate/@corp/@about/@ar/
documents/corporate/p123836.pdf.
58
See, e.g., Capital Markets Regulatory Reform: Strengthening Investor
Protection, Enhancing Oversight of Private Pools of Capital, and Creating a National
Insurance Office: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 176
(2009) (statement of Richard Ketchum, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer,
Financial Industry Regulatory Authority).
59
See FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REPORT OF THE AMERIVET DEMAND
COMMITTEE OF THE FINANCIAL INDUSTRY REGULATORY AUTHORITY, INC. 86 (2010),
available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/corporate/@corp/documents/corporate/
p122217.pdf (FINRA benchmarks its senior management compensation based on
levels in the financial services industry and states that “non-profit organizations and
governmental agencies were inadequate comparables for compensation purposes.”).
As disclosed in FINRA’s 2010 Annual Report, salaries and bonuses for FINRA’s top
executives average $1,057,787. See FINRA 2010 YEAR IN REVIEW, supra note 57, at
18.
60
See, e.g., Letter from Project on Gov’t Oversight to Representative Spencer
Bachus, Chairman, and Representative Barney Frank, Ranking Member, House
Comm. on Fin. Servs. 1 (May 29, 2012), available at http://pogoarchives.org/m/fo/sroletter-20120529.pdf; Letter from Project on Gov’t Oversight to Chairman and
Ranking Member, Congress (Feb. 23, 2010), available at http://www.pogo.org/ourwork/letters/2010/er-fra-20100223-2.html; see also The Madoff Investment Securities
Fraud: Regulatory and Oversight Concerns and the Need for Reform: Hearing Before
57
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Designation of FINRA as the adviser SRO would result in
conflicts of interest, with potential adverse competitive
implications for advisers.61 Broker-dealers are the “sell side” of
the securities industry, while advisers are the “buy side.” The
potential for conflict is demonstrated by FINRA’s explicit
advocacy of extending the broker-dealer regulatory framework to
advisers.62 Conflicts may arise in that broker-dealers engage in
arms-length transactions with investment advisers in various
capacities, including as service providers, counterparties, market
makers, and syndicators and underwriters. An association
representing private fund advisers has observed that these
competing relationships “would present challenges to an SRO
responsible for overseeing these types of firms fairly and
equitably.”63
the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 60 (2009)
(statement of John C. Coffee, Jr., Professor, Columbia University Law School)
(noting that Madoff’s advisory activity was within the NASD’s and FINRA’s
jurisdiction); FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REPORT OF THE 2009 SPECIAL REVIEW
COMMITTEE ON FINRA’S EXAMINATION PROGRAM IN LIGHT OF THE STANFORD AND
MADOFF SCHEMES 5 (2009), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/
corporate/@corp/documents/corporate/p120078.pdf (“FINRA examiners did come
across several facts worthy of inquiry associated with the Madoff scheme that, with
the benefit of hindsight, should have been pursued.”); Letter from Mari-Anne
Pisarri, Pickard & Djinis LLP, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n
5 (Jan. 12, 2011) [hereinafter Pickard and Djinis Letter] (“There is no question that
the NASD/FINRA had both the authority and responsibility to investigate Madoff’s
fraudulent conduct.”); Stewart D. Aaron et al., Arnold & Porter LLP, SRO
Regulation in the Dodd-Frank Era, LAW360 (Apr. 11, 2011, 3:09 PM),
http://www.law360.com/articles/236796/sro-regulation-in-the-dodd-frank-era (“Public
perceptions about the effectiveness of self-regulation were not helped by events such
as FINRA’s failure to detect Lehman Brothers’ controversial Repo 105 accounting, or
FINRA’s declaration of Bear Stearns’ capital adequacy on the very day Bear Stearns
collapsed.”).
61
Alleged Stanford Financial Group Fraud: Regulatory and Oversight Concerns
and the Need for Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban
Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Onnig H. Dombalagian, Professor, Tulane
University) (“The conflicts of interest between the brokerage industry and the
investment advisory industry . . . are too great for FINRA to exercise a meaningful
role in the oversight of investment advisers.”).
62
See Letter from Marc Menchel, Exec. Vice President & Gen. Counsel, Fin.
Indus. Regulatory Auth., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1
(Aug. 25, 2010), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/
@guide/documents/industry/p121983.pdf; see also Letter from Nat’l Ass’n of Sec.
Dealers to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 4 (Feb. 11, 2005); Letter
from Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 1
(Apr. 4, 2005).
63
Letter from Richard H. Baker, President and Chief Exec. Officer, Managed
Funds Ass’n, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 10 (Dec. 16, 2010)
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FINRA’s lack of accountability makes it particularly illsuited to extend its reach to investment advisers. The BCG
Section 967 Report repeatedly stated that SROs are not
accountable to the SEC and that the agency and SROs were not
coordinating effectively.64 In this regard, it stated that FINRA
“merits particular attention given its size and scope.”65 For
example, the report observes that “FINRA conducts extensive
risk assessment activities in support of its examinations,” but
does not share its analysis with the SEC.66
Further, in a report released in May 2012, the GAO found
that neither the SEC nor FINRA had conducted any formal
retroactive review of FINRA rules to assess their actual impact
after implementation.67 The report also found that the SEC
historically has not conducted oversight of FINRA’s governance,
conflicts of interest, funding, executive compensation, or
cooperation with state regulators. Further, FINRA recently
opposed an attempt by its members to subject FINRA’s
rulemakings and amendments to economic and cost-benefit
analysis.68
According to the Chamber of Commerce Report discussed
above, FINRA’s members no longer have a meaningful role in
establishing its policies and priorities, and the organization is not
moving toward greater transparency and accountability.69 The

[hereinafter MFA Section 914 Letter], available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/dftitle-ix/enhancing-ia-examinations/enhancingiaexaminations-28.pdf.
64
BCG SECTION 967 REPORT, supra note 24, at 65–67, 237–38.
65
Id. at 66.
66
Id. at 67.
67
2012 GAO REPORT, supra note 30, at 12–15.
68
See, e.g., Letter from Stephanie M. Dumont, Senior Vice President & Dir. of
Capital Mkts. Policy, Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y,
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 7 n.27 (Dec. 23, 2011) (“After all, no SRO is required to
undertake an economic analysis of its rule proposals . . . . [T]here is no statutory or
Exchange Act Rule requirement to undertake an economic analysis because a
commenter makes such demand and we are unaware of any requirement on the part
of the Commission to oblige such commenters.”).
69
CAPITAL MARKETS REPORT, supra note 23, at 23; see also Brief for the Cato
Institute and Competitive Enterprise Institute as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 6–7, Standard Inv. Chartered, Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, 132
S.Ct. 1093 (2012) (No. 11-381), 2011 WL 5128121, at *6–7 [hereinafter Cato Brief]
(“Constitutional accountability typically stems from either of two sources: political
accountability or legal accountability. Here, political accountability is de minimis
due to the layers of authority separating FINRA from executive branch officers.
Unfortunately, legal accountability—judicial review—has also eroded, leaving
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report states that “[t]ransparency into FINRA’s governance,
compensation, and budgeting practices is extremely limited and
superficial. Furthermore, FINRA is not subject to the Freedom
of Information Act or the APA, nor is it required to conduct a
cost-benefit analysis when it engages in rulemaking or exercises
its policy-making functions.”70 Unlike the SEC, FINRA is not
subject to the Government in the Sunshine Act and its board of
directors does not hold open meetings. On the other hand,
FINRA claims that it is a governmental or quasi-governmental
regulator when it suits its interests, such as claiming sovereign
immunity when sued. Similarly, FINRA is not accountable to
any entity with respect to its budget—neither to Congress nor to
the SEC.71
Because of these numerous shortcomings, the Cato Institute
recently concluded that “FINRA’s extra-constitutional operation
has fostered significant policy failures including agency capture,
lax regulation, and biased arbitration. . . . The proliferation of
substantial financial industry scandals over the past decade is
evidence that FINRA is, at best, a hands-off regulator and, at
worst, a corrupt and self-serving company.”72 These concerns are
underscored by FINRA’s recent settlement of civil charges by the
SEC for repeatedly misleading the SEC by altering documents
sought by the agency during routine inspections.73
III. USER FEES PAID BY SEC-REGISTERED ADVISERS ARE
PREFERABLE TO AN SRO
Congress should consider appropriate legislation authorizing
the SEC to require that federally registered investment advisers
pay user fees, rather than subjecting them to an SRO. Such user
fees should be dedicated for the sole purpose of enhancing the
SEC’s investment adviser inspection program over and above
current inspection levels. Legislation authorizing investment
FINRA and similarly situated SROs almost entirely unaccountable.” (citations
omitted)).
70
CAPITAL MARKETS REPORT, supra note 23, at 23.
71
See Atkins Testimony, supra note 31, at 10–11; 2012 GAO REPORT, supra note
30, at 21.
72
Cato Brief, supra note 69, at 9, 11.
73
David S. Hilzenrath, SEC Accuses Brokers Group of Deception, WASH. POST,
Oct. 28, 2011, at A12; Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Orders FINRA To
Improve Internal Compliance Policies and Procedures (Oct. 27, 2011), available at
http://sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-227.htm.
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adviser user fees should include provisions that will provide for
appropriate reporting and audit requirements to enable
Congress, the public, and the investment advisory community to
ensure that the funds are being used for their intended purposes
and to provide accountability and transparency. User fees would
be a more effective and efficient means than an SRO to enhance
the oversight of investment advisers and would be less costly.
Investment advisers strongly support oversight by the SEC,
which continues to improve its examination program.
A.

User Fees Are More Effective and Efficient Than an SRO

User fees would be far more effective and efficient in
enhancing examinations of advisers than establishing an
unnecessary additional layer of bureaucracy and cost. The SEC
has more than seven decades of experience regulating and
overseeing the investment advisory profession. Moreover, the
SEC is directly accountable to Congress and the public with
regard to its budget and performance. As SEC Commissioner
Luis Aguilar stated in 2009:
I do not believe that the answer is to create another SRO –
particularly when it would be one without any experience in
dealing with the investment advisory industry and the Advisers
Act regulatory tradition. Moreover, this current crisis has
illustrated the dangers of regulatory fragmentation where the
primary regulator is not able to quickly obtain, assess, and
analyze information. Now is not the time to fragment even
more, but to consolidate and employ smart regulation.
The SEC is the only public agency charged with regulating
our capital markets and maintaining a keen sense of the entire
market on behalf of investors. To create another regulator at
this time without the experience in regulating a principle-based
system of regulation would be too costly for the industry and the
public in terms of both dollars and investor protection.74

74
See Luis A. Aguilar, Commissioner, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC’s Oversight of
the Adviser Industry Bolsters Investor Protection (May 7, 2009) (also noting that the
SEC is “the only entity with experience overseeing investment advisers, an industry
governed by the Advisers Act, which is based on a principles-based regime. By
contrast, broker-dealer SROs primarily regulate through the use of very detailed,
specific sets of rules and are not well versed in the oversight of principles-based
regulation”).
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The Section 914 Report provides many reasons why user fees
would be a preferable approach to an SRO or other options. The
Section 914 Report notes that investment adviser user fees would
provide a stable source of funding that would be scalable to
increases or decreases in the adviser population and could be set
at a level designed to achieve the SEC’s desired examination
frequency and scope.75
User fees are already an important source of funding for
inspections and examinations of other financial institutions and
regulated entities by many federal agencies, including the
Comptroller of the Currency.76 In addition, the SEC previously
supported user fees in testimony related to legislation under
consideration in 1990. Further, investment advisers already pay
user fees to support the Investment Adviser Registration
Depository (“IARD”), the electronic system through which
investment advisers make filings with state and federal
regulators.77 The IARD system therefore provides an existing
infrastructure to collect user fees at a small marginal cost.
The Section 914 Report found that the user fee option would
permit the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and
Examinations (“OCIE”) to improve the effectiveness of its
examinations through long-term strategic planning that would
better use modern technology and its workforce. A stable source
of funding would permit use of technology-based solutions that
can take years to develop and implement.78 Stable resources
would also provide the examination program with increased
flexibility to react to emerging risks and better target staffing
and strategic resources as appropriate. The staff observed that
knowledge gained from the investment adviser examination
program would continue to greatly assist in gathering the

75

SECTION 914 REPORT, supra note 20, at 25.
The Section 914 Report notes that:
user fees fund inspections of banks conducted by the Office of Comptroller
of the Currency, examinations of credit unions by the National Credit
Union Administration, inspections of nuclear facilities by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, inspections of national marine fisheries by the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and quality
examinations of agricultural commodities and processing plants by the
Department of Agriculture.
Id. at 25–26.
77
Id. at 26.
78
Id. at 26–28.
76
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intelligence and expertise critical to the regulatory process.79
Further, ongoing improvements to the examination program
could be further leveraged with the funding provided by user
fees. The SRO model would not provide such benefits to the SEC.
Indeed, in its analysis of the various options to increase
examinations, the Section 914 Report found that user fees
present the greatest number of advantages and the least number
of disadvantages.80 The report observes that “imposing user fees
would avoid the difficult scope of authority, membership,
governance, and funding issues raised by an SRO . . . . It would
avoid the need for the Commission to use resources to staff an
expanded SRO examination program.”81 The Section 914 Report
also noted that funding from adviser user fees would give the
SEC greater flexibility and may be a less costly option than
establishing an SRO.
Indeed, the report notes that in many ways, user fees may be
a smarter, more efficient use of funds.82 Allowing OCIE to charge
user fees would empower it to build on the expertise and
infrastructure it has already established in examining advisers.83
Within the SEC, OCIE examination staff benefit from close
working relationships with other SEC legal and policy staff.84 In
contrast, an SRO would be an isolated cost center that would
require extra resources and personnel to build even a
preliminary infrastructure.
Further, as noted above, an SRO would still require an
increase in the SEC’s management and coordination costs in
order to oversee the SRO.85 In fact, the SEC staff expressed
concern that if SRO oversight were mandated, it may one day be
79

Id. at 27 n.47.
See, e.g., ELISSE B. WALTER, STATEMENT ON STUDY ENHANCING INVESTMENT
ADVISER EXAMINATIONS 7 (2011) (noting with disappointment that the “study
attributes virtually no disadvantages to the user fee option, but many disadvantages
to the SRO and FINRA dual registrant options”).
81
SECTION 914 REPORT, supra note 20, at 29.
82
See id. at 27; see also Oversight of the Mutual Fund Industry: Ensuring
Market Stability and Investor Confidence: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital
Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 200 (2011)
(statement of Paul Schott Stevens, President and Chief Executive Officer,
Investment Company Institute); MFA Section 914 Letter, supra note 63; Letter from
David G. Tittsworth, Exec. Dir., Investor Adviser Ass’n, to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2 (Oct. 19, 2010) [hereinafter IAA Section 914 Letter].
83
See SECTION 914 REPORT, supra note 20, at 28, 30.
84
See id. at 28.
85
See id. at 27.
80
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underfunded because there is no certainty that the level of
resources available to the Commission over time would provide
for effective oversight.86 In addition, with the user fee option,
“the chance that inconsistencies would emerge in interpretation
or application of the Advisers Act and its rules between a thirdparty examining body (such as an SRO) and the statute’s and
rules’ primary administrator (the Commission) would be
eliminated.”87
B.

User Fees Would Be Less Costly Than an SRO

In considering legislation to enhance investment adviser
examinations, Congress should consider the costs and benefits of
the various alternatives. The IAA is not aware of any analysis or
empirical data demonstrating that the benefits associated with
H.R. 4624 would have outweighed the costs. To the contrary,
there is compelling evidence that the costs of outsourcing
regulation and oversight of thousands of investment advisers to
an SRO—likely FINRA—would be far greater than the
comparable costs of enhancing the SEC’s inspection program.
In this regard, a study commissioned by the IAA, the
Certified Financial Planner Board of Standards, Inc., the
Financial Planning Association, the National Association of
Personal Financial Advisors, and TD Ameritrade Institutional, is
highly relevant.88 These groups commissioned BCG to produce a
report determining the costs of the options outlined in the
Section 914 Report on enhancing investment adviser
examinations.
The December 2011 BCG economic analysis analyzed the
costs of the following: (1) increasing the level of SEC
examinations; (2) set-up and operation of an investment adviser
SRO by FINRA; and (3) set-up and operation of an entirely new
SRO for advisers. BCG’s economic analysis was based on the
assumption that advisers would be examined by the SEC or an
SRO on an average of once every four years.
The economic analysis found that the costs to investment
advisers of adequately funding the SEC to conduct additional
examinations would be far less than paying FINRA or another
86

See id. at 28.
Id.
88
The December 2011 BCG economic analysis is appended to this testimony for
the record. See generally BOS. CONSULTING GRP., supra note 2.
87
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SRO to do so.89 It underscores the conclusion that the best and
most efficient way to enhance investment adviser oversight is to
ensure that the SEC has sufficient resources.
Key findings of the BCG economic analysis include the
following. First, creating an SRO for advisers would likely cost
at least twice as much as funding an enhanced SEC examination
program.90 The incremental cost of the SEC hiring the additional
adviser examiners needed to increase the inspection rate for
advisers to, on average, once every four years—including
supporting expenses—would be $100 million to $110 million per
year.91
The total cost of an enhanced SEC examination
program—including both the costs of the existing program and
the incremental costs related to hiring the additional
examiners—is projected to be $240 million to $270 million per
year.92 In contrast, a FINRA SRO—examination, enforcement,
and SEC oversight—is projected to cost $550 million to $610
million per year; and a new SRO is projected to cost $610 million
to $670 million per year.93
Second, the cost savings to the SEC of creating an SRO is
likely to be minimal because the SEC would need to spend
significant resources—$90 million to $105 million per year—
overseeing an SRO.94 Third, the startup costs of an SRO alone—
$200 million to $310 million—could fund an enhanced SEC
examination program for an entire year—$240 million to $270
million.95 Fourth, shifting primary oversight of dually registered
broker-dealers and investment advisers—those regulated by both
the SEC and FINRA—to FINRA alone is not expected to result in
significant costs savings to the SEC.96
Further, as discussed above, H.R. 4624 was structured such
that the substantial costs of establishing an SRO for advisers
would be imposed on small businesses rather than being shared
across the industry, as assumed in the BCG economic analysis.
In other words, if the bill had been enacted, the fixed costs of
establishing an SRO with rulemaking, examination, and
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96

See id. at 12.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 13.
See id. at 12.
See id. at 7.
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enforcement authority would have been assessed on a smaller
group of advisers with limited resources. Accordingly, the actual
costs incurred by these small businesses would have been even
higher than under an industry-wide or user fee approach.
BCG released an addendum to this analysis on May 10, 2012
to discuss FINRA’s estimate—a one-and-a-half page document
titled “Investment Estimate for FINRA IA SRO”—that was
released concurrent with the introduction of H.R. 4624 on April
25.97 According to BCG’s analysis, FINRA’s estimate of the cost
to set up, operate, and oversee a SRO for investment advisers
greatly underestimated the overhead costs and overestimated
investment adviser examiner productivity.98
C.

Investment Advisers and Other Commenters Strongly
Support Continued SEC Oversight of Advisers

In addition to the IAA, a number of other organizations and
commenters have voiced numerous concerns about establishing
an SRO for investment advisers and have expressed support for
ensuring adequate resources for the SEC.99 For example, the
97

See Press Release, Inv. Adviser Ass’n, FINRA’s Cost Estimates Challenged:
Leading Financial Services Organizations Respond to FINRA’s Estimates (May 10,
2012), available at https://www.investmentadviser.org/eweb/docs/Publications_News/
PressReleases/PressCur/120510prs.pdf.
98
Specifically, BCG found that: (1) FINRA’s estimate omits the cost of SEC
oversight of the IAN SRO ($90 to $100 million) and the cost of enforcement ($60 to
$70 million), both of which are required by H.R. 4624; (2) FINRA’s estimate of $12 to
$15 million in setup costs does not include staff costs incurred during the twelvemonth setup period, specifically the cost of examiners and support staff. Rather,
FINRA only includes these expenses as part of its ongoing investment once the SRO
is up and running. This omission accounts for $180 to $230 million of the difference
between the BCG and FINRA estimates; (3) FINRA’s estimate of the ongoing annual
cost of examining 14,500 IA firms once every four years assumes that FINRA’s IA
examiners would be able to nearly double the productivity rate of SEC IA examiners
by performing five or more examinations per examiner per year. This compares to
SEC IA examiner productivity of 3.0, and FINRA broker-dealer examiner
productivity of 2.8. This productivity assumption accounts for $150 to $170 million of
the difference between the BCG and FINRA estimates; and (4) FINRA’s estimate
does not include overhead costs in its estimate of $150 to $155 million of ongoing
annual investment. Overhead costs account for $135 to $140 million of the difference
between the BCG and FINRA estimates. Id.
99
See, e.g., Pickard and Djinis Letter, supra note 60, at 4 (“While the costs of
designating one or more SROs for investment advisers are clear the benefits are less
so. In analyzing the question of benefits, we submit that the number of adviser
examinations that an SRO could conduct is less important than the quality of those
examinations. SROs’ lack of familiarity with the extensive regulatory regime
imposed on advisers raises serious concerns about such organizations’ ability to
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Managed Funds Association (“MFA”) has expressed multiple
concerns about an SRO for investment advisers100 and its support
for ensuring that the Commission has adequate resources,
including appropriate user fees.101 Similarly, the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants (“AICPA”) has
expressed its strong opposition to an SRO, and FINRA in
particular,102 and instead indicated its support for providing
appropriate resources to the SEC, including user fees.103 The
Alternative Investment Management Association (“AIMA”) has
opposed an SRO and instead supports “full and proper regulation
and oversight of investment advisers by the Commission and
believes the Commission should be given adequate resources to
fulfil its objectives of protecting investors, maintaining fair,
orderly, and efficient markets and facilitating capital
formation.”104 The North American Securities Administrators
Association (“NASAA”) has expressed its strong opposition to
outsourcing important governmental regulatory functions to a
oversee the implementation of that regime effectively. Moreover, as the Madoff and
Stanford scandals show, SRO examinations can be ineffective even where the
activities being examined are squarely within the purview of the organization’s
jurisdiction and expertise.”).
100
See MFA Section 914 Letter, supra note 63, at 2 (“[A]n SRO would lack
experience in regulating private fund managers, create inconsistent regulation for
investment advisers, face difficult conflicts of interest, increase regulatory costs, and
ultimately diminish the quality of regulatory oversight of the industry.”).
101
See Letter from Richard H. Baker, President and Chief Exec. Officer,
Managed Funds Ass’n, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 5 (Sept.
22, 2010) (“[W]e would support appropriate fees on investment advisers to help
ensure that OCIE has the resources they need to conduct examinations of the
investment adviser industry.”).
102
See Letter from Barry C. Melancon, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Am.
Inst. of CPAs, to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2 (Nov. 24, 2010)
(“We strongly oppose the creation of a self‐regulatory organization (SRO) for
investment advisers. An SRO is inherently conflicted and is not the right answer for
regulation of investment advisers. We believe that FINRA would bring a
broker‐dealer perspective, and bias, to investment adviser examinations and that its
rules‐based, check‐the‐box approach is not conducive to adequate regulation of the
investment advisory profession nor is it in the public’s best interest.”).
103
Id. (“AICPA strongly believes that the principles-based regulatory approach
of the Investment Advisers Act and its related rules should continue to govern
investment advisers and further, that regulatory oversight remain exclusively with
the SEC and/or states. Providing the SEC with resources to properly enforce their
rules, even if it means assessing additional fees on investment advisers, is the best
solution for investment advisers and the public.”).
104
See Letter from Mary Richardson, Dir. of Regulatory & Tax Dep’t, Alt. Inv.
Mgmt. Ass’n, to the Sec. & Exch. Comm’n and Gov’t Accountability Office 3 (Jan. 12,
2011).
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third party.105 Further, the Financial Planning Coalition has
noted the many drawbacks to an SRO for investment advisers,
and to FINRA in particular,106 and stated its support for
continuation of the SEC’s regulation and oversight of the
advisory profession.107
D. The SEC Improved Its Investment Adviser Examination
Program and Should Continue Its Oversight of All SECRegistered Advisers
The IAA has consistently supported the SEC’s efforts to
strengthen its examination program for investment advisers.
The IAA testified in 2011 before the Committee on Financial
Services in support of efforts to strengthen the SEC’s investment
adviser examination program conducted by OCIE.108 Adequate

105
See Letter from David L. Massey, President, N. Am. Sec. Adm’rs Ass’n, Inc.,
and Deputy Sec. Adm’r, State of N.C., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch.
Comm’n 2–3 (Nov. 22, 2010) (“[I]nvestment adviser regulation is a governmental
function that should not be outsourced to a private, third-party organization that
does not have expertise or experience with investment adviser regulation. Securities
regulation in general and investment adviser regulation in particular is best left
with governmental regulators that are transparent and directly accountable to the
investing public. One can readily conclude that the designation of an SRO for the
oversight of investment advisers, with its attendant direct and indirect costs, its
opaque structure and attendant lack of accountability and transparency, would
outweigh any perceived benefits to the investing public.”).
106
See Letter from Kevin R. Keller, Chief Exec. Officer, CFP Board, et al., to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 5 (Dec. 16, 2010) (“Creating a
new layer of bureaucracy and cost in order to improve the frequency of investment
adviser examinations is not a wise use of limited regulatory resources. Aside from
the additional infrastructure costs involved with creating an SRO oversight
structure for investment advisers, outsourcing oversight could result in inconsistent
or redundant regulation and enforcement (as both the SRO and the Commission
interpret and enforce the relevant rules).”).
107
Id. at 3 (“We believe it would be much quicker and more efficient to leverage
the Commission’s existing investment adviser examination staff, which is already
fully conversant with all of the legal and regulatory issues that pertain to
investment advisers, than to create an entirely new SRO from scratch to oversee
investment advisers.”).
108
See Letter from David G. Tittsworth, Exec. Dir., Inv. Adviser Ass’n, to Mary
L. Schapiro, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (July 29, 2009), available at
https://www.investmentadviser.org/eweb/docs/Publications_News/CS09/comment090
729A.pdf. See generally Ensuring Appropriate Regulatory Oversight of BrokerDealers and Legislative Proposals To Improve Investment Adviser Oversight: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on
Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. (Sept. 13, 2011) (statement of David G. Tittsworth, Exec.
Dir., Inv. Adviser Ass’n) [hereinafter IAA 2011 Testimony].
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resources for, and a commitment to, an effective SEC
examination program for investment advisers should be a high
priority for policy makers and for the SEC.
During the past few years, the SEC has focused on
revitalizing and restructuring its enforcement and examination
functions.109 The mission of the examination program is to
“improve compliance, prevent fraud, inform policy and monitor
industry-wide and firm-specific risks.”110
The SEC has
implemented a more risk-focused examination program to
provide information for SEC enforcement investigations and to
inform the financial industry about risky practices. The program
continually collects and analyzes a wide variety of data about
investment advisers using quantitative techniques.111
OCIE has continued to refine its examination tools and
techniques to better allocate and leverage limited resources to
their highest and best use.112
In 2011, OCIE created a
centralized risk assessment and surveillance office to evaluate
risks across all markets and registrant categories. OCIE’s risk
office has enhanced the ability of the SEC to perform data
analytics to identify firms that present the “greatest risks” to
investors, markets, and capital formation, and to determine
which firms to examine.113 OCIE now provides a risk-rating to
all new and existing investment adviser registrants based on
data collected from the newly expanded Form ADV and other
public data. In addition, OCIE has increased its outreach to
senior management and mutual fund boards along with the
examination process regarding risk and regulatory issues.114
OCIE has also developed a large firm monitoring program
whereby OCIE collaborates with SEC divisions and offices in
monitoring risks at certain large firms.115 Under this new
109

See generally SEC 2012 Testimony, supra note 49.
Carlo V. Di Florio, Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections & Examinations,
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Address at the Private Equity International Private Fund
Compliance Forum (May 2, 2012) [hereinafter 2012 Di Florio Speech], available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2012/spch050212cvd.htm.
111
See SEC 2012 Testimony, supra note 49.
112
See 2012 Di Florio Speech, supra note 110.
113
See id.; see also SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, EXAMINATIONS BY THE SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N’S OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS AND EXAMINATIONS 8 (2012)
[hereinafter OCIE EXAMINATIONS], available at http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/
ocie/ocieoverview.pdf.
114
See 2012 Di Florio Speech, supra note 110.
115
See id.
110
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process, OCIE’s examinations are tailored to a firm’s risk rating
and risk areas such as business model and revenue streams,
affiliations and conflicts of interest, and compliance controls.
OCIE also uses tips, complaints, referrals, and surprise custody
audits to help determine which advisers to examine and the
scope of the exams.116
The SEC has also continued to take important steps to
increase the examination staff’s expertise in the securities
markets including recruiting experts with knowledge of hedge
funds, private equity, derivatives, complex structured products,
and valuation, as well as strengthening current examiner skill
sets and developing an examiner certification program.117 In
addition, OCIE is developing information management systems
to help better organize and evaluate the extensive new
information that the SEC collects on Form ADV and Form PF.118
These systems will provide the SEC with substantial additional
detailed information about advisers’ business practices to assist
in risk-targeted examinations, enforcement, and oversight of
advisers.119
In fiscal year 2011, OCIE examined approximately eight
percent of advisers out of the 11,000 or so SEC-registered
investment advisers, representing thirty percent of the total
AUM by all SEC-registered investment advisers.120 While the
number of advisers examined can and should be increased, the
SEC’s breadth in covering thirty percent of investors’ assets

116

See id.
See id.; see also The Stanford Ponzi Scheme: Lessons for Protecting Investors
from the Next Securities Fraud: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 62 (2011) (statement of
Robert Khuzami, Director, Division of Enforcement, Securities and Exchange
Commission and Carlo Di Florio, Director, Office of Compliance Inspections and
Examinations, Securities and Exchange Commission); Oversight of the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission’s Operations, Activities, Challenges, and FY
2012 Budget Request: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. & Gov’t
Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 70–71 (2011)
(statement of Carlo Di Florio, Director, Office of Compliance Inspections and
Examinations, Securities and Exchange Commission); SECTION 914 REPORT, supra
note 20, at 28.
118
2012 Di Florio Speech, supra note 110.
119
See Reporting by Investment Advisers to Private Funds and Certain
Commodity Pool Operators and Commodity Trading Advisors on Form PF,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3145, 2011 WL 242758, at *4 (proposed Jan.
26, 2011).
120
See SEC 2012 Testimony, supra note 49.
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managed by advisers is substantial.121 Further, as noted above,
OCIE reviews data and information about all investment
advisers. Both at a national and regional level, the examination
staff then can identify from the adviser universe the set of
advisers with the most “risky” profiles and subject those advisers
to in-depth examinations. The SEC plans to add examination
staff in fiscal year 2014 to improve the rate of examination of
advisers, including those advisers that have not been
examined.122 Even now, however, OCIE conducts outreach to
new advisers and those that have never been examined. The
SEC requests information from such advisers and, based on that
information and other data, prioritizes such advisers for review.
Contrary to the perceptions created by some statistics, all
investment advisers are on OCIE’s radar screen.
The IAA continues to encourage the SEC to consider ways in
which it can increase the frequency of investment adviser
examinations under its current allocation of resources and any
future allocated resources. However, we are prepared to support
user fees to the SEC to increase the SEC’s frequency of
examinations of investment advisers. User fees would be a far
more effective approach than outsourcing the SEC’s
responsibilities to a non-governmental organization.
CONCLUSION
The IAA supports appropriate measures to ensure that the
SEC conducts a strong and effective examination program of
investment advisers. We strongly oppose establishment of an
SRO for investment advisers such as that which would have been
mandated by H.R. 4624 and urge Congress to instead consider
appropriate user fee legislation.

121
We note, however, that the frequency of examination per adviser is only one
factor in an effective examination and oversight program. See SECTION 914 REPORT,
supra note 20, at 26 n.46; see also 156 CONG. REC. S5929 (2010) (statement of Sen.
Christopher Dodd) (stating the following with respect to Section 913: “In this review,
the paramount issue is effectiveness. If regulatory examinations are frequent or
lengthy but fail to identify significant misconduct—for example, examinations of
Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC—they waste resources and create an
illusion of effective regulatory oversight that misleads the public.”).
122
Financial Services and General Government Appropriations for 2014:
Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 113th Cong. 56
(2013) (statement of Mary Jo White, Chairman, Securities and Exchange
Commission).

